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A Theory of Recognition as Framework for Religious Education. 
Reading Axel Honneth from a pedagogical and theological perspective 
Experiences of withheld and of granted recognition constitute an integral part of 
everybody’s learning biography, as the experience of recognition is crucial to all 
processes of socialization and identity formation. In consequence, the last two 
decades have seen a considerable interest in recognition theories, initially 
particularly in the field of political and social theory but later extending into 
educational contexts. In dialogue with the influential theory of recognition by 
German philosopher Axel Honneth, this paper develops an interpretation of 
recognition which can enrich the theory of education, and in particular that of 
religious education. A theological perspective on recognition is provided that 
aims to identify and specify the distinctive contribution that religious education 
can make to the realization of recognition in schools and the basic implications 
for theory and practice that follow from this.  
Keywords: recognition; Axel Honneth; religious education; religious recognition 
Experiences of withheld and of granted Recognition 
After school Anna arrives at home. She is really exhausted and demotivated. The 
following dialogue between Anna and her mother ensues: 
Anna […]: Ms. Bari’s lessons today really sucked. She asked me about the new 
vocabulary and I couldn’t remember two forms, but that was no problem. 
Afterwards I told her that I did not remember one word, which was true at first, but 
I recalled it just a moment later and told her the correct word. Still, she said that 
she wouldn’t count it, and she gave me the lower grade. She told me not to give up 
that quickly again.  
Mother: How did you feel about it? 
Anna: I thought that she was a jerk and that she could eat my shorts. (Lehmann-
Rommel 2009, 307–8, own transl.) 
Almost everyone will be familiar with this kind of situation, either from one’s own 
school career or from being a parent. Stories like this often become indelible part of our 
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memory. We will recollect these stories over years or even decades, but – in most cases 
– we refuse to talk about them due to the negative experiences we had to endure. In the 
example quoted from empirical research on after-school conversations between children 
and parents, Anna can talk frankly with her mother. Anna’s fierce reaction shows that 
the prima facie unremarkable learning situation has left a lasting impact on her, induced 
by her teacher’s behaviour: on the one hand, the teacher undermines Anna’s self-
confidence; on the other, she wants her to gain self-confidence by not giving up so 
easily. How might Anna have interpreted the teacher’s performative message? Possibly 
as follows: ‘No matter how hard I try, I will never meet my teacher’s expectations.’ At 
the same time, the whole situation could have easily ended positively if the teacher had 
been prepared to react carefully and empathetically. But instead this situation has 
become a discouraging one, and threat to the student’s personal autonomy; an ordinary 
learning situation develops into an experience of refused recognition. 
Experiences of withheld recognition and fortunately others of granted 
recognition form an integral part of everybody’s learning biography. They illustrate the 
reasons why ‘recognition is a basic psychological need that human beings have’ (Vainio 
and Visala 2016, 556; cf. Taylor 1992, 26). Everybody is in need of recognition, and if 
recognition is refused it can hurt us. Recognition is crucial to all processes of 
socialization and identity formation, and consequently it is also of importance to 
educational processes (cf. Iser 2013). Against this background, it should not come as a 
surprise to know that the last two decades have seen a considerable interest in 
recognition theories, beginning particularly in the field of political and social theory (cf. 
McBride 2013; Thompson 2006), being followed by an emerging form of it in 
educational contexts (cf. Hanhela 2014b; Bingham 2006, 2001). In spite of an 
increasing body of international literature, the concept of recognition still upraises 
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several basic pedagogical questions. What does recognition mean in educational 
settings? Is it primarily linked to institutional issues like school organization or 
curriculum development, or does it rather aim at pedagogical interactions in the 
classroom (cf. Stojanov 2016, 766)? Is it possible and/or preferable to acquire 
recognition, and can there be something like a ‘pedagogics of recognition’ (Hafeneger, 
Henkenborg, and Scherr 2013)?  
Starting with these basic questions this paper aims to show that recognition is a 
socio-philosophical concept which can enrich the theory and practice of education, and 
in particular of religious education. For this purpose, the paper provides three 
consecutive steps by way of clarification. First, a theoretical notion of intersubjective 
recognition is developed, mainly by reference to the influential recognition theory of 
German philosopher Axel Honneth. Second, this concept is critically evaluated and 
specified by moving from general to explicit pedagogical interactions. The third part 
develops a theological perspective on recognition in order to specify the distinctive 
contribution that religious education can make to the realization of recognition in 
schools. All these clarifications lead to the conclusion that acknowledging recognition is 
a key concept of religious education with far reaching theoretical and practical 
implications (cf. Altmeyer 2015 for a previous version of the argument published in 
German). 
Theory of Recognition according to Axel Honneth 
What does recognition mean? In everyday language, there are numerous possibilities of 
meaning (cf. Iser 2013). What can be recognized are quite different things like the rights 
of a person or group, paternity, state borders, a personal opinion, or even study courses 
from exchange semesters. What these cases have in common is that the act of 
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recognition always contains two aspects: another person or matter is firstly perceived 
and secondly accepted. ‘The notion of recognition can be explained as a process during 
which the cognitive perception and the evaluative acceptance of a person or matter take 
place simultaneously.’ (Pollmann 2008, 28, own transl.) 
In social contexts, the focus of recognition lies in the relationship between two 
or more persons. As a special form of recognition, this social phenomenon is called 
intersubjective recognition with the dual aspect mentioned above being also part of it: a 
person who recognizes another, shows the latter that he or she is not only perceived, but 
also positively accepted by the first person. Hence, what constitutes intersubjective 
recognition is at least two persons (‘Me’ and ‘You’), who perceive and accept each 
other mutually – at least in regard to certain attributes: to recognize ‘as’ (cf. figure 1). 
American philosopher Nancy Fraser puts it like this: ‘recognition designates an 
ideal reciprocal relation between subjects in which each sees the other as its equal and 
also as separate from it [...]; one becomes an individual subject only in virtue of 
recognizing, and being recognized by, another subject’ (Fraser 2003, 10). What 
becomes immediately clear here is that recognition as interpersonal relation cannot 
evolve in a vacuum, but only in socio-cultural contexts. Consequently, it can be and 
often is threatened by social or ideological dependencies or relations of power. 
Intersubjective recognition always refers to the ineluctable tension between the ideal of 
mutuality on the one hand and the reality of unequal social relationships on the other. 
Just to name a few examples from a school context: if cultural or religious dietary laws 
are not considered in school meals, if a teacher punishes certain students by not 
listening to them, or if he or she deploys recognition strategically in order to evoke 
socially desirable behaviour; these all represent different forms of refused recognition or 
misrecognition. 
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In this light, it becomes evident that recognition does not only consist of an 
interpersonal dimension, but also of a societal and political dimension. How are the 
conditions of recognition constituted in our society and its institutions? What happens if 
recognition is not mutual or if it is even non-existent? These and similar questions form 
the point of departure for a number of social and political recognition theories that have 
emerged in recent years. They also occupy one of the most influential recognition 
theorists of our time, the German social philosopher Axel Honneth. In his view, 
recognition is the key concept for understanding social conflicts (cf. especially Honneth 
1995, 2012). From the perspective of the persons concerned, social conflicts are 
struggles for recognition. For example, unemployed persons do not only perceive their 
situations as materially threatening, but also as a denial of social recognition; so-called 
‘educational losers’ do not only ask for a less selective educational system, but also for 
the recognition of their tales of woe, and religious or ethnic minorities articulate their 
political expectations as demands for recognition. 
The driving force of all these social movements is – according to Honneth – the 
human need for recognition. If this need is permanently disregarded, this may lead to 
conflicts. Anchored in the tradition of the Frankfurt school and critical theory, Honneth 
emphasizes that recognition is a precarious social good and inquires into the conditions 
of a society within which this good could be best realized. Hence, he ‘sees recognition 
as the fundamental, overarching moral category guiding theory-building and politicized 
praxis aimed at securing social justice.’ (Houston 2016, 4; for further summaries of 
Honneth’s approach cf. Iser 2013; Thompson 2006; Anderson 1995) 
But why do we consider recognition as crucial for the understanding of human 
behaviour and social conflicts? Honneth develops his argument from a re-reading of 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s social philosophy, which he combines with insights 
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from George Herbert Mead’s natural pragmatism, and findings from empirical 
psychology (e.g. Donald Winnicott). While taking the initially speculative ‘idea that full 
human flourishing is dependent on the existence of well-established, “ethical” relations 
[…] which can only be established through a conflict-ridden developmental process, 
specifically, through a struggle for recognition’ (Anderson 1995, xi) from Hegel, he 
substantiates this idea by referring to pragmatic and empirical research on the 
‘intersubjective conditions for individual self-realization’ (Anderson 1995, xi). In short, 
the argument focusses on identity as a personal and social concept, thus as a relational 
process. Identity means that individuals have to learn ‘to perceive and accept 
themselves within the reactive views, gestures, statements and actions of significant 
others’ (Pollmann 2008, 30, own transl.). Individuals can only attain a healthy self-
relation by experiencing recognition from others. If there is no intersubjective 
recognition, we cannot establish a successful relation to ourselves and the development 
of personal identity is at risk. 
Based on this fundamental argument, Honneth unfolds his theory of recognition 
by distinguishing three social spheres of relevant relationships (cf. Honneth 1995, 92–
130): primary or close relationships (partnership, friendship), legal relations and 
communities of shared values. With each of these spheres, he associates a special form 
of recognition (cf. figure 2). 
 In the sphere of close relationships, recognition appears as emotional affection 
(or love). It is an attitude of acceptance and the experience of being accepted by 
a person in his or her distinctive singularity. Both depend upon the relationship 
between individuals or small groups of individuals. A lack of recognition in this 
human area of closeness (through abuse, denigration, emotional neglect) 
threatens the physical as well as the mental integrity of a human being.  
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 Concerning the sphere of legal relations, from its different levels of group rules 
to a state’s legal system, recognition appears as cognitive respect. ‘The legal 
sphere of recognition allows people to be recognized as having “equal status”’ 
(Maia and Vimieiro 2015, 163), which enables the experience of being an equal 
person among equals. People neither have to like or love one another for 
realizing this kind of legal relation. In this case, recognition is based on the 
observance of a rationally established consensus, that is to say: all members of a 
society deserve the same rights. If this concept is disregarded it leads to the 
exclusion of certain persons or groups from certain rights. 
 In the sphere of communities of shared values, from clubs to religious 
communities or the daily working life, recognition appears as social regard or 
solidarity. In addition to the conditions of the legal sphere, people do not only 
aim at being an equal person among equals, but at being special individuals 
among equals. Recognition cannot only be experienced by having objective 
rights, but moreover by contributing one’s individual talents, achievements, 
opinions, etc. to the community, which acknowledges them. Deprecating or even 
insulting individual achievements or opinions of others can be seen as typical 
forms of misrecognition in this sphere. 
In practical contexts, these spheres of social relations and their appropriate ‘forms of 
recognition are interlacing’ (Houston 2016, 13); together they have a specific influence 
on the development of a person’s identity. If a person is recognized in each of the three 
spheres, an important condition for the development of a wholesome identity is 
provided. Honneth emphasizes this point by associating each form of recognition with a 
form of positive self-relation (cf. Honneth 1995, 129). The development of self-
confidence depends upon emotional affection; the development of self-respect depends 
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upon legal acknowledgement and the development of self-esteem depends upon social 
regard. Through this threefold form of self-relation, the development of a wholesome 
identity becomes possible, ‘that is, a way of being attuned with oneself so that self-
respect, self-confidence and self-esteem flourish. The subject’s experience of positive 
recognition from others is the axial hub around which these three aspects of self-relation 
turn.’ (Houston 2016, 4) And vice versa: if a person is permanently exposed to 
misrecognition in one or more of its forms he or she will be in danger of suffering from 
a lack of self-confidence, from self-disrespect and impoverished self-worth potentially 
causing shame (Houston 2016, 18). 
Since its first publication almost thirty years ago and after several clarifications 
and ongoing development (for instance concerning Mead’s naturalistic positions), 
Honneth’s theory has evoked a considerable body of discussion and criticism, many of 
which deal with questions of normativity and universal validity (cf. Iser 2013; McNay 
2008a; Thompson 2006; Fraser and Honneth 2003). For the purposes of this paper, two 
critical limitations of Honneth’s concept of recognition should be considered and borne 
in mind before further reception by educationalists. The first limitation brings a 
psychological perspective to bear by the diagnosis of a problematic ‘recognition deficit 
assumption’ (Vainio and Visala 2016, 560 with reference to McBride 2013). What 
results from deficient or missing recognition? Does misrecognition in every case imply 
negative consequences for self-esteem and identity? It might just be the case that 
misrecognition, for example, also contributes to identity building by dissociation, for 
individuals as well as for groups. In line with this, Houston (2016, 5) criticizes the 
‘assumption that experiences of disrespect, engendering the emotion of shame, lead ipso 
facto to social struggle aimed at seeking withheld recognition.’  
10 
 
The second critique stresses the social and political conditions of individual 
identity formation by pointing to a problematic tendency of psychological reductionism 
(cf. Garrett 2010, 1517; McNay 2008b) in relation to social realities. For these critics, 
Honneth’s theory runs the risk of focusing ‘too exclusively on micro encounters and 
interactions’ (Garrett 2010, 1517) and as a consequence of paying too little attention to 
structural questions. To what degree does the negotiation of personal identity depend 
upon interpersonal interaction between autonomous subjects, and how strongly does this 
process result from the structural and contextual conditions of life? In short: the 
importance of the individual and interpersonal relationships must not be naively 
overestimated. For both ‘inevitably lack the capacity to eradicate and combat 
structurally generated (mis)recognition.’ (Garrett 2010, 1530). Both critiques point to 
the balance of external (social) and internal (personal) powers in individuals developing 
identity. Neither of these poles should be isolated or overemphasized. 
Education and Recognition 
In light of the basic ideas of Honneth’s theory presented above and in consideration of 
its limitations, it seems reasonable to establish a close connection with educational 
questions, for his critical theory of recognition includes ‘the social and pedagogical 
conditions of human development’ (Stojanov 2010, 165). If education is interpreted in 
terms of the Humboldtian tradition of Bildung we are thinking of a process of growing 
individuation of a human being in dialogic encounter with the world and other human 
beings (cf. Humboldt 2010), so the connection becomes evident. In this tradition, 
education is aimed less at knowledge and skills and more on the identity of learners. 
This identity develops dialogically in contact with knowledge, in acquiring 
competences, and in encounters with significant others. Thus, education and recognition 
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seem to form a pair, but how exactly do they interrelate?  
In German speaking pedagogical discourse, numerous receptions of Honneth’s 
theory have emerged within the last fifteen to twenty years (e.g. Hafeneger, 
Henkenborg, and Scherr 2013; Micus-Loos 2012; Balzer and Ricken 2010) whereas 
international interest has remained limited (cf. Houston 2016; Fleming 2016; Huttunen 
and Murphy 2012; Maia and Vimieiro 2015; Hanhela 2014a; Stojanov 2007). A number 
of approaches in Germany were influenced by Wilhelm Heitmeyer’s (2002) thesis of a 
‘social decline of recognition’ and followed a quite simple pattern of argument. 
Empirical research indicated a lack of recognition in schools, with an increasing number 
of students not being able to develop a wholesome self-esteem and hence suffering 
throughout their educational careers. The proposed answer was to foster a culture of 
recognition in schools in order to improve learning outcomes. However, even if it is 
empirically evident that a lack of recognition can evoke feelings of shame, weaken the 
self-concept, and lead to violent conflicts (cf. e.g. Kammler 2013), an improvement of 
personal recognition does not necessarily result in an increase of learning achievements. 
Therefore, German philosopher of education Dietrich Benner (2003, 296) cautions 
against any ‘abstract-ethically postulating use of recognition theories’ (own transl.) that 
frame a kind of categorical imperative for educational theory and practice derived 
normatively from a general recognition theory but without links to specific educational 
tasks and processes. In contrast, Benner claims to interpret the concept from a 
pedagogical point of view, which takes the logic of educational processes into account.  
In this vein of thought, Krassimir Stojanov (2010, 2007) has refined Honneth’s 
theory of recognition in terms of a theory of education. Essentially, he introduces a 
distinction between interpersonal relationships in general and pedagogical relationships 
in the particular context of educational institutions like schools, universities etc. While 
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these relationships also depend deeply on the three forms of recognition they do so in a 
very special way. The example of Anna may help to clarify this. Looking at recognition 
as cognitive respect, Anna feels disregarded by her teacher in view of her right to 
receive acceptance for her correct answer even though this was not articulated in time. 
Furthermore, Anna experiences her performance as not positively acknowledged. For 
her, the simple logic of testing, which classifies her answers as either right or wrong, is 
not really the problem. Anna can accept this logic, but only under the condition that her 
effort receives recognition as social regard. Finally, the dimension of emotional 
affection seems to be addressed as well. Anna’s outburst ‘This jerk can eat my shorts’ 
might lead to the conclusion that she experiences the scene as a disturbance of her close 
relation to her teacher. 
Consequently, what pedagogical and interpersonal relationships have in 
common is that they can be described in terms of granted or refused recognition. What 
makes pedagogical relationships special is that they are not only about self-realisation, 
but also about a growing relationship to the world through the development of 
competences. Stojanov argues: 
Honneth describes self-realisation as the reflexive constitution of personal (and 
personalised) futures by the satisfaction of legitimate expectations of 
intersubjective recognition. Thus, on his account, self-realisation occurs in the 
intersection of relations to oneself, on the one hand, and relations to others, on the 
other. The development of worldviews – that is, the constitution of relations to a 
de-personalised reality – is not presented as an aspect of that intersection. So, 
interpreted, self-realisation means indeed the [formation] and development of 
personal identity but not yet Bildung. For Bildung implies, at least since von 
Humboldt, an interchange between individual and world – that is, it implies not 
only the development of selfhood but also the opening of a world-horizon of 
objective meanings for the individual. (Stojanov 2007, 81)  
Education is about self-development in the medium of referring to the world. In Anna’s 
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case, it is about learning vocabulary. It is not about the recognition of her status as an 
autonomous subject; it is about Anna, as a child, who is learning a foreign language (a 
‘matter’) simultaneously with other children under her teacher’s guidance at school. 
Yet, this is the question of education. How can human beings develop holistically by 
exploring the world which is pedagogically represented in the subject matter? Stojanov 
(2007, 76) suggests adding this material dimension to Honneth’s model of recognition 
in order ‘to approach a threefold relation between intersubjective recognition, the 
development of self-relations and the development of basic forms of cognitive 
capabilities’ (cf. figure 3).  
In summary, recognition is not simply the same as education while, vice versa, 
education covers more than the notion of recognition. Still, the two belong together. 
Education and recognition are mutually dependent. In terms of a critical theory of 
education it has to be stated that education will become difficult if recognition is 
deficient in one of its three spheres. At the same time, education is about particular 
questions of recognition, which cover processes of self-development in the medium of 
acquiring exemplary and orientational knowledge. 
Recognition as a Gift: a Theological Perspective  
At this point, one could easily continue with consequences for the practice of religious 
education deriving from the philosophical and educational theory of recognition. In this 
case, the argument would go like this: there is a task for religious education qua 
education to foster the realization of recognition; and this is definitely correct. And 
indeed, in that sense much could be practically improved as outlined later in the final 
section of this paper. Beyond this general conclusion, I would like to ask a much more 
ambitious question, namely which specific contribution religious education can make to 
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the realisation of recognition. Depending on whether religious education should focus 
on learning about religious traditions or on learning from contact with a religious 
tradition, this question has to be answered differently. Here, I am taking the position of 
‘teaching and learning in the combined about and from approach’ (Miedema 2017, 
134). Following this, religious education aims at enabling students ‘to evaluate their 
understanding of religion in personal terms and to evaluate their understanding of self in 
religious terms’ (Miedema 2017, 133). Thus, my argument is that the unreplaceable 
contribution of religious education to general education (Bildung) lies exactly in 
referring to what religion itself has to say about recognition. In the following, my 
perspective is not generally or comparatively on religion but originates from a Christian 
theological perspective and is primarily oriented towards a denominational form of 
religious education as given in my German context (cf. e.g. Boschki 2015). The aim is 
to show how a theological perspective could substantially complement the theory of 
recognition by pointing to its crucial blind spot (for further theological readings of 
recognition theories cf. e.g. Saarinen 2016; Ryan 2016; Pally 2016; Hoffmann 2013; 
Moyaert 2009). 
In order to introduce a theological perspective on recognition and to substantiate 
its potential for religious education, I will, by way of example, concentrate on a central 
biblical text, which can be regarded as a source of a Christian theology of recognition 
(cf. Hoffmann 2013, 315–46): the narrative of the so-called ‘Prodigal Son’ (Luke 15,11-
32). In this parable, the main character loses all his filial rights after he had spent his 
part of his father’s inheritance that he had demanded before the appropriate time. He 
knows that he cannot assert any claims on his father (v. 21b). In terms of recognition 
theory, there is no legal argument, which forces his father to treat him in another way 
than any random person asking him for help. The father appreciates that his son has 
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forfeited his filial rights by symbolically handing them back to him: ‘Bring forth the 
best robe, and put it on him; and put a ring on his hand, and shoes on his feet’ (v. 22). 
There is no claimable reason to recognize this son again, but yet this father decides to 
do so. He even goes beyond the legal sphere of cognitive respect by addressing him 
with emotional affection. The father has been watching for his son (why else than out of 
love?), he sees him coming, recognizes him from afar and welcomes him with a warm 
gesture of open arms. Contrary to any usual achievement principle, the father arranges a 
festive reception. By this action, he re-integrates the seemingly lost son into the forms 
of recognition that are integral to social appreciation and regard. Exactly this is what – 
understandably enough – evokes his brother’s displeasure. In this critical situation of 
recognition conflict, the father asks the elder brother whether his standards of legal and 
social recognition might be inadequate. The father reminds him: ‘It was fitting that we 
should make merry, and be glad’ (v. 32a). Why? Because it’s not about daily concern 
but about ultimate questions of life and death: ‘for this thy brother was dead and is alive 
again’ (v. 32b). The father’s standard of recognition goes beyond the legal sphere or any 
expectations in terms of achievement principles – for him, recognition is a gift, which is 
given without expecting anything. This is the logic of recognition the father has in his 
mind. He perceives the returning young man as what he himself does no longer claim to 
be: his son, and while he affectionately receives him and hands him back all his rights 
and social recognition, he accepts him as the one he always was and always will be: his 
son.  
This example invites us to take a closer look at what happens at the limits of the 
three spheres of recognition explained above. Interpersonal recognition is fragile and 
reaches its limits in that very moment when an infinite human need for recognition is 
confronted with an always finite human ability to grant it (cf. Moyaert 2009, 303). 
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Hence, theologian Markus Knapp (2006) suggests adding another form of recognition to 
the socio-philosophical theory of recognition and associating it with the relational 
sphere of faith. According to him, this fourth form of recognition is related to the self-
relational dimension of self-acceptance. Beyond self-confidence, self-respect and self-
esteem, self-acceptance refers to a kind of recognition which is not dependent on any 
conditions and social struggles. It’s about the limits, deficiencies and the fragmentary 
nature of human existence, it’s about failure and guilt which indicate a need for 
recognition, which is far beyond what human beings can grant. 
Acknowledging that intersubjective recognition is limited, the theological 
reading of the parable of the Prodigal Son can show that Christian faith tells about a 
form of recognition which reaches beyond the sphere of social struggle. It is a search for 
recognition that does not have to be achieved, but that is granted unconditionally (cf. 
figure 4). Theologian Jürgen Werbick (2011, 299) explained this notion by 
reformulating Anselm of Canterbury’s famous definition of God: recognition is a ‘gift 
than which nothing greater can be given.’ (own transl.) It points to the gift of 
unconditional acceptance of every human being by God: you are granted recognition – 
no matter if and how you are perceived and accepted by other human beings – and even 
by yourself. 
Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing discussions, the link to possible consequences that can be 
justified by the pedagogical and theological reading of Honneth’s theory of recognition 
is made. To begin with, this concerns education and learning in general. If recognition 
in its three forms is essential for the development of identity, every lesson should allow 
the realisation of recognizing relationships. At the same time, it should consider that 
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social realities of recognition and misrecognition have an impact on schooling in 
general and on concrete lessons particularly. Education cannot change these conditions, 
but must take them into account. Thus, teachers have to pay attention for recognition as 
emotional affection, social regard and cognitive respect in all classroom interactions. At 
the same time, it has always to be considered how the culture of recognition in a class, 
school and social school context is mirrored in concrete learning situations.  
Assuming that religious education should foster a ‘personal religious and 
responsible stance’ (Miedema 2017, 137) from contact with a religious tradition, it is 
supposed to create a peculiar profile in addition to the general striving for recognition in 
educational processes. Religions have to offer their very own contribution to the 
concept and the praxis of recognition. This is especially true for the Christian tradition. 
In this sense, learning from and about religion participates in general in interpersonal 
recognition learning but beyond this it may stand for a form of recognition which 
reaches beyond the sphere where people have to fight or negotiate with others or where 
they are in the position to grant each other anything. It may stand for the idea of 
recognition as a gift of unconditional affirmation with self-acceptance as counterpart in 
personal self-relation.  
Under this premise, recognition becomes a challenge for religious education, at 
least if the notion in question goes beyond merely appealing to recognition theory and 
incorporating it into religious education. Instead, recognition could be a key concept of 
religious education, the potential of which still has to be explored: a content-related 
concept that demonstrates the distinctive core of what religious education is about.  
Remember one more time Anna and imagine how the after-school dialogue with her 
mother could have sounded if her negative experiences had been in religious education 
classes. The situation with the teacher could have happened just as well. It would just 
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not have been about vocabulary but about for instance the Ten Commandments, the 
Golden Rule or any other religion matter. Perhaps she would have remembered the fifth 
commandment too late and the teacher would not have counted it. Anna would have had 
to experience the teacher’s behaviour as misrecognition of her right that a correct 
answer has to be counted, her individual achievement and her emotional relationship to 
her teacher. So far, there would not be any difference to the language lesson. The 
difference only becomes obvious, if we assume that the content of religious education 
relates to how it is taught and learned. In this case, the teaching situation would have 
lacked the religious dimension of recognition. It is only after school when this 
dimension is touched in talking to her mother. Now, Anna can experience that she is 
precious even though she does not hit all expectations. 
After all, the question of exact knowledge remains relevant for religious 
education but this does not remain the only facet of learning. There is more to religious 
learning than producing correct or incorrect answers; it’s about becoming sensitive to 
one’s ultimate concern of being unconditionally recognized. If religious education 
conveyed a sense of this, it would have achieved its most important and most specific 
goal. 
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